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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000100030024-8


Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Foreign Intelligence Board
FROM : Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

1. We reviewed the role of the DCI in warning and discussed the options for the mechanisms needed to support me in that role. In May I issued my decision on those options and set the general direction for the warning function at the national level (Attachments A and B). I charged the NIO for Warning and the Warning Working Group with completing the details.

2. I also noted the need for a full-time NIO for Warning, and I am seeking your assistance in filling that position. I need an experienced senior intelligence officer who can perform the varied roles of the NIO for Warning (Attachments C and D). While currently active civilian and military intelligence officers would be the logical candidates, qualified retired officers will not be excluded from consideration.

3. Please assist me in the selection of an NIO for Warning by forwarding nominations to me or directly to Chairman, Warning Working Group.



William J. Casey

Attachments:
As stated

Upon Removal of Attachments
Regrade as UNCLASSIFIED

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SUBJECT: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

28 MAY 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Decision on Warning Working Group Report

1. My discussion and consideration of the warning issues has continued in a variety of forums since we reviewed the Working Group Report at the 19 January NFIB. Drawing upon the report for a frame of reference, I have made the following decisions:

- a. We should consider the National Intelligence Warning System as defined in the current DCID to be composed of the separate warning activities in the Intelligence Community components plus the NIO for Warning.
- b. The mission of the system is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to warning intelligence and to coordinate the warning activities of the Intelligence Community.
- c. The basic warning mission will be as defined in DCID 1/5: "to avoid surprise to the President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance..." That mission and definition will be expanded as appropriate to ensure attention to more slowly developing, longer-term intelligence problems relating to the security of the United States. The warning mission will give highest priority to warning of an attack on the US or its allies.
- d. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence will oversee the National Intelligence Warning System with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
- e. The position of National Intelligence Officer for Warning will be a full-time position. His mission is to advise and assist the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on all matters relating to warning, to coordinate national intelligence warning activities, and to serve as a focal point for warning in the Community. He will to the maximum extent rely on existing organizations in carrying out his duties. His responsibilities are:

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All Portions of This Memorandum

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- (1) To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources which might provide warning. In particular, he should be alert to alternate interpretations within the Community and assess these with a view to the need for issuance of warning. He should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at all levels in the Community.
- (2) To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President and National Security Council, and to ensure the dissemination of such warning within and by the organizations of the Intelligence Community. When time is of the essence, the National Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the President and the National Security Council, with concurrent dissemination to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and senior officers of the Intelligence Community.
- (3) To advise the Chairman, National Intelligence Council and the DCI Watch Committee on appropriate Community response to developing warning situations.
- (4) To support the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.
- (5) To chair the Warning Working Group.
- (6) To oversee the warning activities of the National Intelligence Officers.
- (7) To supervise the National Warning Staff.
- (8) To arrange for intelligence research and production with respect to strategic warning.
- (9) To develop a warning consciousness and discipline throughout the Community.
- (10) To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures for warning, including communications and dissemination of information.
- (11) To arrange with appropriate organizations of the government for provision to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the Warning Staff of the information they need to carry out their mission.

- (12) To promote improved analyst training in indications and warning techniques and in other analytic techniques that might contribute to improved warning.
 - (13) To advise the Director, Intelligence Community Staff and the chairmen of the collection requirements committees, as appropriate, on warning activities that relate to their responsibilities.
- f. The Warning Working Group, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, will assist him in carrying out his responsibilities and in coordinating Community warning activities. Its Members shall be senior officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Office of the Secretary of Defense; and the Intelligence Community Staff. The Chairman shall invite representatives of other departments and agencies to attend when matters of concern to them are discussed.
 - g. The National Intelligence Officers continue to be charged with substantive responsibility for warning in their respective fields. They will conduct Community-wide reviews at least monthly of situations potentially requiring the issuance of warning, and will keep the Director of Central Intelligence advised of the results, in consultation with the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. They will be continually alert to the need for immediate issuance of warning.
 - h. The Strategic Warning Staff is disestablished.
 - i. A National Warning Staff is established to support the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. This will be a small staff with appropriate representation from the Intelligence Community.
 - j. DCID 1/5 will be revised and reissued to bring it into accord with the decisions described above and with the current structure of the Intelligence Community.

2. The Chairman, National Intelligence Council and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning will work with you to implement these decisions.

William J. Casey

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DCI TALKING POINTS
ON WARNING

NFIB 8 June 1982

(Not Used)

- I. Decision Memo on warning completes a series of efforts to improve our ability to produce warning intelligence.
 - A. New initiatives in research support production of warning.
 1. Center for Terrorism Instability and Insurgency will identify causes and indicators of change.
 2. Intelligence Producers Council will coordinate Community research efforts on Third World and Soviet Bloc developments having warning implications.
 - B. NIO's will identify mid- to long-term warning situations through their estimates and monthly warning meetings.
 - C. Watch Committee will highlight short-term warning developments.
 - D. Alerting of fast breaking events will continue to be the function of our Ops Centers through the use of procedures such as CRITICS and NIOWONS.
- II. NIO for Warning and National Warning Staff will oversee and advise all the above.
 - A. Identify events and alternative outcomes not given adequate hearing in standard products.
 - B. Participate in and contribute to the production of estimates and Watch Committee reports.

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- C. Nominate, contribute, participate, conduct or coordinate specific research projects on warning matters.
 - D. Draw upon the results and products of individual agency and departmental warning activities, but not rely exclusively on their efforts. The whole should be greater than the sum of the parts.
- III. The Warning Working Group will be retained to assist the NIO/W. I look to them to carry out the implementation of this decision.
- IV. Warning function and Warning Staff will continue to be a Community effort.
- A. Warning function will be lodged in the National Intelligence Council.
 - B. NIO/W will be a full time position.
 - C. Composition, size and location of the staff will be worked out by Warning Working Group.
- V. The Warning mission will continue to be to insure "no surprise" to the President, NSC and Armed Forces. Obviously warning of an attack on the US or its allies is first priority; however, we must also address slowly-developing, longer-term threats to US security--within the warning context.
- VI. The Alert Memorandum will be retained as a warning medium, but it is not the exclusive one since both estimates and the Watch Committee reports will have warning content. Other means of conveying the warning message will be employed when needed. Content, not form, is what is important.

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

14 July 1982

CONCEPT PAPER

The National Intelligence Officer for Warning will be the Director's personal representative and will report directly to the DCI.

Any tasking the NIO for Warning levies on elements of the Intelligence Community will be subject to DCI approval and will pass through normal command channels of the NFIB member agencies.

The NIO for Warning is expected to maintain extensive informal contacts with elements of the NFIB agencies and others in the official and private sectors in pursuit of his responsibilities.

The NIO for Warning will assist the Director in:

- indentifying the requirements for warning,
- evaluation of warning products and programs,
- identifying uncertainties requiring guidance on collection, analysis or production.

(See current draft of DCID 1/5 for further details)

The NIO for Warning will be supported by an Assistant NIO for Warning and the National Warning Staff. The A/NIO for Warning serves as the NIO for Warning's alter ego and acts in his behalf when the NIO is absent.

The National Warning Staff performs those functions and tasks assigned by the NIO for Warning in the accomplishment of his responsibilities.

Tasks illustrative of the staff's activities are to monitor warning related events and Community production, prepare papers

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outlining important developments, implications, explanations or hypothesis not fully addressed in Community publications, assist and coordinate NIO Monthly Warning Meetings, coordinate production of Alert Memoranda, review National Estimates for appropriate warning implications, recommend agenda items to the Watch Committee, coordinate and support production of the Community General Indicator List, conduct research on warning matters, support Community training programs, participate in Community post-mortems on crises and warning performance, and support Community developments in warning-related collection, processing and analysis.

The warning staff will devote particular attention to providing a safeguard second look at current developments of potential warning significance. It will provide a balance to current intelligence production by selectively performing the challenge function, primarily by developing alternative interpretations of information and events that address the potential for surprise, especially in matters of greatest consequence for US security interests. The NIO/W and his staff will promote sensitivity to the "lessons" of previous warning episodes, in particular, the crucial importance of making explicit the analytical assumptions that underlie prevailing evaluations and estimates.

It is proposed that the National Warning Staff be composed of three professional intelligence officers on rotational assignment with appropriate clerical support and that the personnel needs be reevaluated periodically.